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Tort cases that examine causation have a common factual structure.  First, the injurer fails 
to take care.  Second, some intervening act or omission occurs.  The presence or absence 
of the intervening act alters the risk associated with the injurer’s failure to take care.  
Third, the victim is injured. 
 
This paper presents a core model of the causation problem and uses it to explore 
incentives for care in a rich set of causation scenarios.  In the core model, the impact of 
the injurer’s care on the probability of an injury depends on an intervention that 
determines whether care will be effective.  Many negligence cases fall within this model; 
perhaps the most famous is New York Central R.R. v. Grimstad.1 In Grimstad the 
plaintiff’s decedent, captain of a covered barge, drowned after falling off the barge when 
it was bumped by a tugboat while lying in port.  The captain’s wife, with him at the time 
of the accident, brought suit on the theory that the barge owner was negligent in failing to 
install lifebuoys.  If lifebuoys had been on the barge, according to the wife, she would 
have been able to grab one and throw it in time to save the captain.  The appellate court 
held that although the barge owner was negligent in failing to equip the barge with 
lifebuoys, there was no evidence that the captain’s wife would have been able to find a 
lifebuoy and throw it in time.  Since the captain’s drowning probably would have 
occurred even if the barge had been equipped with lifebuoys, the plaintiff lost her 
negligence lawsuit, on causation grounds. 
 
This one-sided intervening causation scenario, in which the defendant’s care depends on 
an intervention that determines whether care will be effective, is common in the 
negligence cases, and has been examined from an economic perspective in Shavell 
(1980), Landes & Posner (1983), Grady (1983), Kahan (1989), Marks (1994), and Hylton 
& Lin (2013).  The Shavell, Landes & Posner, Grady, Kahan, and Marks papers assume 
that courts have full information.2  Hylton and Lin assume courts have limited 
information, in the sense of not knowing the distribution of the probability of 
intervention. 
 
If courts have full information, injurers will exercise optimal care under the negligence 
test in the presence of intervening causation; assuming no judicial error (Grady, 1983, 
Kahan, 1989).3  If, on the contrary, courts have limited information, injurers may not 
exercise optimal care.  Since the limited information setting is likely to be common (or at 
                                                 
1 264 F. 334 (2d Cir. 1920). 
2 Although Grady, Kahan, and Marks assume courts have full information, in the sense of being able to 
determine the optimal standard or level, they do allow for courts to make mistakes in determining whether 
the injurer complied with the standard.  
3 If there is a risk of judicial error in applying the negligence test, then actors may take too much care in the 
full information model if courts do not apply the negligence test accurately; but if courts apply the test 
correctly, care incentives will be optimal.  For a recent survey, see Grady (2013).  To clarify the Grady-
Kahan analysis, it may be useful to consider an example from Kahan’s article.  Suppose a cricket ball is hit 
over a fence whose height was set unreasonably low, and injures a person, who then sues the owner of the 
cricket grounds. If the ball would have sailed over a fence set at a reasonable height, then a court would 
find against the plaintiff on causation grounds.  However, it is easy to see in this example how error in 
application of the negligence test might arise.  For example, one source of error is the difficulty in 
determining precisely whether in fact the cricket ball would have cleared a fence set at reasonable height. 
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least not uncommon), the interesting question is finding the direction and magnitude of 
the distortion from optimal care, under conditions that reflect the actual decision 
processes of courts in causation cases.   
 
The problem of limited information in causation analysis was first addressed by Calabresi 
(1975), who suggested that courts, constrained by lack of information and by evidence 
norms, essentially perform an ex post evaluation of negligence in intervening causation 
cases, using information revealed by the accident.4  We examine the distortive potential – 
that is, the extent to which care deviates from the socially optimal level – of the ex post 
negligence assessment here. 
 
More specifically, we extend the one-sided causation analysis under limited information 
to the two-sided causation scenario.  In the two-sided causation scenario the effectiveness 
of the injurer’s care depends on some intervention, as in Grimstad.  However, in addition, 
the risk of harm generated by the injurer’s failure to take care depends on some other 
intervention.  Like the one-sided causation scenario, the two-sided causation scenario is 
common in the negligence case law.  One Posner opinion widely cited for its description 
of the negligence test, McCarty v. Pheasant Run,5 examines such a scenario. 
 
The two-sided causation scenario presents a potentially interesting problem for several 
reasons.  First, from the perspective of tort doctrine, the possibility of intervention 
altering the effectiveness of the injurer’s care is treated as a “factual causation” issue, and 
the possibility of intervention altering the risk associated with the injurer’s failure to take 
care is discussed as a “proximate causation” issue.  This model examines the incentive 
effects of tort law in the presence of combined factual and proximate causation issues.  
Second, although care is generally distorted from optimality in the one-sided causation 
scenario, an optimal care outcome still remains possible, and is plausible in that scenario 
for many negligence settings.6  The question this raises is whether optimal care is still a 
plausible outcome in the two-sided scenario.  
 
To elaborate, given the distortion of care from optimality in the one-sided causation 
scenario, is the distortion compounded in the two-sided causation scenario, as seems 
likely, and how bad is the resulting distortion?  Does the distortion suggest that optimal 
or inadequate care outcomes are unlikely?  These questions are addressed here. 
 
We develop a measure of the extent to which care is distorted from the optimal level 
under the negligence test in the presence of intervening causal factors.  We find that in 
the two-sided causation scenario, the distortions from optimal care are considerably more 
severe than in the one-sided scenario.  The direction of the distortion depends on the 
distributions of both of the relevant intervention probabilities.  Using simulations 
incorporating assumptions we consider representative of negligence cases, we find that 
the general distortion is toward excessive care.  More importantly, the simulations 
                                                 
4 On the ex post nature of causation analysis, see also Wright (1985), Landes & Posner (1987). 
5 826 F.2d 1554 (7th Cir. 1987). 
6 Hylton & Lin (2013). 
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suggest that the compounding of distortions is so great that both the optimal care and the 
inadequate care outcomes are unlikely in the two-sided scenario. 
 
In our simulations, we use the Beta distribution for the intervention probabilities because 
it permits us to simulate a wide range of probability distributions for the intervention 
probabilities – from symmetrical to strongly skewed.  The different parameters of the 
model permit us to simulate a wide event space of outcomes under the negligence test.  
We find that the parameter assumptions (specifically, regarding the productivity of 
precaution) required to generate optimal or inadequate care outcomes in the two-sided 
causation scenario are so narrow that these outcomes appear to be implausible.  We also 
find that there is a possible solution: under a proportionate damages measure, as 
suggested in Shavell (1985), the optimal care outcome is considerably more plausible.7 
 
The practical lesson of this paper is that the likelihood that injurers will have optimal care 
incentives under the negligence test in the presence of intervening causal factors affecting 
both care and risk appears to be low.  The model developed here provides a more fine-
grained analysis of the relationship between causation and the incentive for care than 
under standard models that assume full information courts.8  The model could be applied 
to analyze incentives in real world settings in which probability distributions can be 
assigned to causal interventions.  Moreover, the model could be applied to more general 
settings in law enforcement where causation issues arise. 
 
Part II presents several examples of causation scenarios reflected in the negligence case 
law, and uses a numerical example to illustrate our core argument.  Part III presents the 
model and our method of measuring the distortion from optimal care.  Part III also 
presents conditions under which care is optimal, excessive, or inadequate under the 
negligence test, and simulations of the model.  Part IV concludes. 
 
II. Two-Sided Causation Scenarios: Examples 
 
Given the ubiquity of intervening causal factors, every negligence dispute could be 
viewed as a two-sided causation case, depending on the granularity with which one 
identifies intervening factors.  Even in the simple automobile accident, the effectiveness 
of care in maintaining, say, a braking system depends on the attentiveness of the driver 
(an intervening factor on the care side), and the dangerousness of failing to take care 
depends on the presence of potential victims (an intervening factor on the harm side). 
 
But courts do not view every negligence case as a two-sided causation problem.  The 
causation question arises only in cases where the facts raise a substantial question 
whether the actor should be considered negligent in light of the low probability of a 
                                                 
7 To be precise, we find that the optimal care outcome is possible irrespective of the assumed value of the 
productivity of care. 
8 One can view the full information model as a special case of the limited information model.  An 
intermediate case, which we do not consider here, would have the court knowing the distribution of the 
intervention probability for only one of two intervening factors.  The approach used in this paper for 
measuring distortion from optimal care could be applied to intermediate versions. 
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particular intervention occurring.  Here are some examples that illustrate the sorts of 
cases in which the causation problem attracts attention. 
 
A. Boat Safety Scenario 
 
The first two-sided causation scenario we consider is a straightforward extension of the 
Grimstad facts.  Recall that in Grimstad, the captain fell overboard after his barge was 
bumped by a tugboat while it was anchored in port.  The bump is itself an intervention 
that dramatically increased the risk of an injury. 
 
In this new scenario there are two potential interventions that affect the productivity of 
taking care (i.e., installing lifebuoys).  One intervention is on the care side: care is 
ineffective unless someone can get to a lifebuoy in time to save the drowning victim.  
The other intervention is on the risk side: failing to take care (failing to install lifebuoys) 
does not increase the risk of injury unless a tugboat bumps the barge. 
 
To get a sense of the influence of causation assessments, consider the following 
illustration.  The barge owner, who has decided not to install lifebuoys, knows how often 
the captain is likely to be alone (or with only his wife) instead of surrounded by 
experienced sailors.  Also, the barge owner knows how likely it is that the barge will be 
bumped by a tugboat while lying in port.  
 
The probability of intervention on the care side is the probability that a certain type of 
rescuer will be available (on one extreme, an experienced sailor, or, on the other extreme, 
the captain’s wife).  The expected probability of care-side intervention averages over the 
rescuer types.  After the accident occurs, the court sees the specific rescuer and forms an 
estimate of the intervention probability for the event that materialized.  Similarly, the 
expected probability of intervention, on the risk side, averages over the times when a tug 
is likely to bump the barge and the times when a tug is unlikely to do so.  These events 
depend on the density of tugboat traffic.  The expected probability of risk-side 
intervention averages over the relevant traffic densities. 
 
Assume two probabilities of care-side intervention, ¼ and ¾.  The low probability 
corresponds to the instances in which the captain is on the barge with only his wife while 
the high probability corresponds to instances in which the captain is with other 
experienced sailors.  The low intervention probability scenario occurs with frequency ¼ 
and the high intervention probability scenario occurs with frequency ¾.  Thus, the 
expected probability of care-side intervention is (¼)(¼) + (¾)(¾) = 58.   The frequencies 
of the high-intervention and low-intervention probability scenarios are known to the 
barge owner but not to the court. 
 
Similarly, let there be two probabilities of risk-side intervention, ¼ and ¾, where the low 
probability reflects the likelihood of a bump from a tug in low density periods (only one 
tug is present) and the high probability is the likelihood of a bump in high density periods 
(two tugs are present).  Let the corresponding traffic density frequencies be ¼ and ¾.  
These probabilities are known to the barge owner but not to the court. 
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Finally, let the probability of an injury be ¾ if the barge owner fails to install lifebuoys, 
and ¼ if the barge owner installs lifebuoys and the lifebuoys are effectively deployed.  
The cost of installing lifebuoys is $1,500, and the injury resulting from the captain’s 
drowning is $10,000. 
 
Under the standard “Hand Formula” approach, the barge owner should install lifebuoys if 
the cost of taking care is less than the expected loss avoided.  To fail to do so under these 
conditions would constitute negligence.  The expected loss avoided is simply the 
differential in injury probabilities multiplied by the average probabilities of intervention 
(on both the care side and the risk side): 
 
   (58)( 58)(¾ - ¼)($10,000)  = $1,953.12 
 
Since the cost of installing lifebuoys, $1,500, is less than $1,953.12, the barge owner is 
negligent in failing to do so. 
 
After the accident occurs, and the lawsuit filed, the court reviews the accident evidence, 
and determines negligence based on actual (or realized) intervention probabilities.9  
Suppose the accident occurs in the low density period (only one tug is present) and when 
the captain is on the barge with only his wife.  Based on the observed evidence, the 
expected loss avoided by installing lifebuoys is 
 
      (¼)(¼)(¾ - ¼)($10,000) = $312.50 
 
And since this is less than the cost of installing lifebuoys, the court concludes that the 
barge owner was not negligent. 
 
The key behind the court’s conclusion, legally valid and economically erroneous, is its ex 
post assessment of causal factors.  On the care side, the court concludes that the 
likelihood of intervention preventing an injury (deployment of lifebuoys) is too low to 
have made a difference.  On the risk side, the court concludes that the likelihood of an 
intervention leading to an injury (a bump by a tugboat) is too low, given the observed 
traffic density, to require heightened precaution. 
 
B. Safe Lock Scenario I 
 
                                                 
9 Unless the barge owner voluntarily reveals the expected intervention probabilities, the court has no way of 
determining them.  And from the court’s perspective any testimony on these probabilities would be 
regarded as conjectural and speculative, since it cannot be tested and verified.  The observed intervention 
probabilities, however, are verifiable and therefore acceptable as a basis for determining negligence.  
Courts are required to use verifiable rather than speculative or conjectural evidence.  This is a fundamental 
rule in many provisions of state and federal evidence law, and in civil jury instructions. See, e.g., 
Vermont’s general jury instructions, at 
http://www.vtbar.org/UserFiles/Files/WebPages/Attorney%20Resources/juryinstructions/civiljuryinstructio
ns/generaljury.htm. 
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Another two-sided causation scenario involves the decision to lock something that might 
be valuable to keep it out of the hands of thieves.  Suppose, for example, a hotel or 
jewelry store has a choice whether to purchase a safe in which to store valuable items.  
For the safe to be effective against thieves, however, someone tending the safe has to 
lock it.  In Wallinga v. Johnson,10 the plaintiff left jewelry to be kept in a hotel safe, but 
the hotel employees failed to lock the safe.  Thieves robbed the hotel and took the 
jewelry. 
 
However, failing to lock a safe does not create a risk if thieves never attempt to steal.  
Thus, in this scenario there are two types of intervention that affect the productivity of 
taking care (installing a safe): intervention on the care side (locking the safe), and 
intervention on the harm side (by thieves). 
 
C. Safe Lock Scenario II 
 
In the previous scenarios the risk of an intervention leading to injury was assumed not to 
depend on whether the actor took care.  In Boat Safety Scenario, for example, the 
probability of a boat bumping the barge does not depend on whether the barge installed 
lifebuoys.  In Safe Lock Scenario I, the probability that thieves would attempt to steal 
does not depend on whether a safe was present. 
 
In many instances, taking care does affect the probability that a third party will intervene.  
Consider the risk of a car theft as a function of the safety measures taken by the car 
owner.  If the owner is careless, and leaves his keys in a visible place in the car, then an 
intervening actor (thief) may open the car and drive off with it.  On the other hand, if the 
owner is careful, taking his keys and locking his car door, it is still possible that a thief 
will steal the car.  But the probability of car theft is clearly higher when the owner leaves 
the keys in the car.  In Ross v. Hartman,11 a thief, spotting the key in the ignition, stole 
the defendant’s car and negligently ran over the plaintiff.  The court found that the thief’s 
conduct was proximately caused by the defendant’s negligence. 
 
In Strong v. Granite Furniture Co.,12 the defendant’s negligent failure to lock the window 
of the plaintiff’s house allowed a burglar to enter.  The court held that the burglar’s 
damage was not proximately caused by the defendant’s negligence.  Leaving the 
windows open makes it easy for a burglar to enter.  However, locking the windows does 
not foreclose the possibility of a burglary; it only reduces the probability.   
 
There is only one intervening act (theft) in the two examples just considered (Ross and 
Strong).  Still, these are cases of two-sided causation, because the probability of third 
party intervention depends on whether the initial actor takes care. 
 
It is easy to modify the previous scenarios (Boat Safety, Safe Lock I) to allow for the 
kind of interdependency observed here.  In Safe Lock I, for the safe to be effective, the 
                                                 
10 131 N.W.2d 216 (Minn. 1964). 
11 138 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943). 
12 294 P. 303 (Utah 1930), 
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person tending the safe must remember to lock it.  However, thieves might be less likely 
to attempt to steal when they are aware that a safe is present.  The thieves might assume 
that the safe is locked, and decide to find some other hotel (diversion effect) where the 
owners do not use safes.13 
 
II. Model 
 
We start with a presentation of the standard one-sided causation scenario, and then move 
on to two-sided scenarios.  First, we lay out the basic model and then develop a measure 
of the distortion from optimal care. 
 
A. One-Sided Causation 
 
1. Core Model 
 
Taking care affects the probability of an accident, but the effect is conditional on an 
intervention.  Let r = the probability of an injury given that the injurer does not take care.  
Let s = the probability of an intervention that makes care effective, w = the probability of 
an injury if the intervention occurs, w < r.  Let x = the cost of taking care, and let L = the 
loss suffered by the accident victim.  Moreover, we assume we assume x < (r – w)L. 
 
The causation problem described is captured in the following tree diagram (Figure 1). 
 
   
         Figure 1: Causation event diagram 
 
Before the injurer chooses how much care to take, the probability of intervention is 
unknown; only its distribution is known by the injurer.  After the injurer invests in care, 
the actual intervention probability s0 is revealed and an accident occurs.  The injurer’s 
care decision is a durable type of precaution that affects the probability of an accident 
once the intervention probability is realized later.  The court cannot observe the 
distribution of the intervention probability, but the court does observe the actual 
intervention probability s0 when it determines liability. 
 
                                                 
13 On the diversion effect of precaution against theft, see Baumann & Friehe (2013). 
w 
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Let the intervention probability be governed by the distribution G(s) with corresponding 
density g(s).  Taking care is socially desirable if the expected social cost when the injurer 
takes care is less than the expected social cost when the injurer does not take care,  
( ) ( )x r w E s L  , where E(s) = 1
0
( )sg s ds is the expected value of the intervention 
probability.  
 
However, since the court has limited information it cannot apply the optimal care 
standard, x < (r – w)E(s)L, to determine negligence.  Specifically, the court does not 
know G(s) and therefore cannot determine E(s). 
 
In view of the court’s limited information, we model the negligence determination in the 
presence of an intervening causal factor as an ex post assessment – an assessment based 
on the observation of the actual intervention probability.14  There are two justifications 
for this approach. 
 
First, this is what courts have done in the causation cases.  The court’s finding against 
causation in Grimstad was based on its ex post observation of the actual intervention 
probability, which was determined by the fact that the captain’s wife was the only person 
on the barge at the time of the accident.  The ex post assessment method is common in 
the causation cases.15 
 
Second, the ex post approach is more or less required by established evidence and 
procedure constraints.  Courts are required to use verifiable rather than speculative or 
conjectural evidence.  The observed intervention probability is verifiable, while the 
distribution of the intervention probability is a matter of speculation and conjecture for 
the (limited-information) court.  Moreover, testimony from the informationally-
advantaged defendant on the distribution of the intervention probability would also be 
non-verifiable, as well as biased by self-interest. 
 
Under the ex post assessment of negligence, the injurer will be held liable if he fails to 
take care and, under the particular realization of the intervention probability, say s0, care 
would have been socially beneficial, x < (r – w)s0L.  It follows that the injurer takes care 
under the negligence test when 
                                                 
14  The notion that negligence is determined ex post, using information revealed by the accident, is noted in 
Calabresi (1975) and assumed in the early formalization of Landes & Posner (1983).  The ex ante versus ex 
post problem is discussed briefly in Landes & Posner (1987, at 235), though informally and only in 
response to criticisms of their work. 
15 Consider a few examples.  In Gyerman v. United States Lines, 7 Cal. 3d 488, 498 P.2d 1043, 102 Cal. 
Rptr. 795 (1972), the defendant charged the plaintiff with contributory negligence for failing to inform his 
supervisor of a dangerous condition in the workplace.  The evidence suggested that the accident probably 
would have happened even if the plaintiff had informed the supervisor.  The court concluded that the 
defendant failed to show that the plaintiff’s negligence was a substantial factor causing the injury. In 
Rouleau v. Butler, 152 Atl. 916 (N.H. 1931), involving an accident between the defendant’s truck and the 
plaintiff, the defendant failed to signal his turn, but the plaintiff’s driver was not looking for the signal over 
most of the time in which it might have made a difference.  In Weeks v. McNulty, 48 S.W. 809 (Tenn. 
1898), the court found that a hotel was negligent for failing to install a fire escape, but there was 
insufficient evidence to indicate that the plaintiff’s decedent would have used a fire escape. 
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Hylton & Lin (2013) prove that in the one-sided intervening causation scenario, the 
negligence test leads to socially excessive care if (r – w)E(s) < r[1–G(E(s))], socially 
optimal care if equality holds, and socially inadequate if the inequality is reversed.  The 
left hand side of this inequality, (r – w)E(s), is the marginal social benefit of care (per 
dollar of loss L).  The right hand side, r[1–G(E(s))], is the marginal private benefit of care 
evaluated at the efficiency cut-off (x = (r – w)E(s)L).  Thus, if the marginal private 
benefit of care, at the efficiency cut-off, exceeds the marginal social benefit of care, the 
incentive for care will be excessive. 
  
Our approach to measuring the incentive distortion is to examine the wedge between the 
marginal social benefit of care and the marginal private benefit of care at the efficiency 
cut-off.  That measure is equal to: L{(r – w)E(s) – r[1–G(E(s))]}, which is negative in the 
case of a distortion toward excessive care and positive in the case of a distortion toward 
inadequate care.  Letting D represent the distortion, 
 
    (1 ( ( )))
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G E sD
E s
   ,                      (2) 
 
where φ = (r – w)/r, and measures the productivity of care.16 
 
For comparison purposes we consider examples in which we calculate the relative size of 
the incentive distortion for a fixed value of the loss L.  For these comparisons it is 
sufficient to look only at D. 
 
For example, if the intervention probability follows the Exponential distribution, 
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16 Under a proportional damages measure (r – w)L/r, this distortion measure simplifies to a term 
proportional to E(s) – (1 – G(E(s))), which is equal to zero for a symmetric distribution.  However, for non-
symmetric G, the distortion problem remains.  Shavell (1985) proposes a proportional damages measure for 
causation cases.  The proportional damages award also represents the setting where counterfactual damages 
are subtracted.  Thus, subtracting counterfactual damages would not be sufficient to generate optimal care. 
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As φ goes from zero to one, care becomes more productive.  The distribution parameter λ 
is equal to the expected value of the intervention probability.  The optimal care curve 
consists of the parameter values (φ, λ) for which the distortion measure D = 0, which 
traces out a rectangular hyperbola. 
 
2. Simulation 1: Beta Distribution 
 
We allow for the intervention probability (signal) to have a Beta distribution.  The 
advantage of the Beta is that it permits us to examine the incentives for care as the signal 
distribution changes from symmetrical to skew. 
 
Figure 2 shows the value of D as a function of the mean of the signal distribution 
(α/(α+β)).  We used different values for the productivity of care φ, shown in the box in 
Figure 2.  The distortion curve shifts up as the productivity of care increases.  The dashed 
curve is associated with a value of φ of 2/3.  The dotted curve is associated with a φ value 
of .89.  The diamond-dotted curve is associated with a φ value of roughly .95.  The solid 
black curve is associated with a φ value of .5.17 
 
As we increase the mean of the Beta-distributed signal, we move from a signal 
distribution that is skewed right to one that is skewed left.  The symmetrical distribution 
is represented by the midpoint along the horizontal axis, where α/(α+β) = .5. 
 
In plotting the curves shown in Figure 2, we assumed α+β = 20.  In order to change the 
degree of skewness of the distribution, we moved the parameters, in one-digit increments, 
from the combination {α = 1, β = 19} to the combination {α = 19, β = 1}, and plotted the 
distortion measure for each of the corresponding values of α/(α+β).  In other words, the 
values of α/(α+β) begin at 1/20 and run up to 19/20. 
 
Where the distortion variable is negative, the actor takes excessive care.  Inadequate care 
is associated with positive distortion values.  Optimal care is observed where the 
distortion value is equal to zero. 
 
Figure 2 indicates a tendency toward excessive care under the negligence test.  For most 
of the distribution patterns simulated the distortion measure is negative.  This is 
somewhat counterintuitive if ones’ first inclination is to think that the causation 
requirement reduces the scope of liability, and should therefore result in a weaker 
incentive for care. 
 
                                                 
17 We used φ = (⅔ - ⅓)/(⅔) = .5 for the solid black curve. 
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The three highest curves in Figure 2 cross the zero distortion line, which means that there 
exists a set of Beta distribution parameter values, under the three highest assumed 
productivity of care levels (φ = .67, φ = .89, and φ = .95), for which care is socially 
optimal.  The dashed curve, which graphs distortion levels for φ = .67, crosses the zero 
distortion line (optimal care) when the signal mean value (α/(α+β)) is roughly equal to 
.85.  The dotted curve (φ = .89) crosses the zero line when the signal mean is .6.  The 
diamond-dotted curve (φ = .95) crosses the zero line when the signal mean is .55.  The 
solid black curve (φ = .5) does not cross the zero distortion line.   
 
 
 
                  Figure 2: Distortion from Optimal Care, Beta Distribution Case 
 
 
This simulation implies that in order to have an outcome in which care is socially 
optimal, rather than excessive, both the productivity of care and the signal mean have to 
have relatively high values.  Specifically, for optimal care to be observed under the 
negligence test, the degree of the productivity of care must be above a certain threshold 
(specifically, φ  ≥  .65)18 and the signal distribution must be sufficiently skewed to the 
right.  
 
                                                 
18 We ran several simulations for different values of the productivity of care (φ), and found that the 
productivity value must be greater than or equal to .65 in order to observe an outcome in which care is 
optimal (D = 0). 
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B. Two-Sided Causation 
 
Here we model two-sided causation scenarios – again in the presence of limited-
information courts.  After examining some two-sided causation models, which are by no 
means exhaustive of the types of cases in which the two-sided causation problem might 
arise, we examine simulations.  We compare the results of the one-sided model 
simulations to those of the two-sided model simulations in order to determine whether the 
degree of distortion from optimal care is greater in the two-sided scenario.  We find that 
the distortion is greater. 
 
1. Independent Interventions 
 
The first set of two-sided causation scenarios we consider involves independent 
interventions – that is, scenarios where intervention on the care side is independent of the 
probability of intervention on the risk side.  For ease of comparison with previous results, 
we start with an extension of the Boat Safety Scenario examined in the preceding section 
of this paper. 
 
a. Boat Safety Scenario 
  
Continuing with the scenario based on Grimstad, suppose the risk of injury depends on 
the conduct of an intervening actor.  Specifically, suppose that the risk of drowning 
increases substantially only if the captain’s barge is bumped by a tugboat. 
 
Let q = the probability that an intervening injurer appears (e.g., the barge is bumped by a 
tug).  We will assume that q is a random variable, like the other intervention probability 
s, and that it is independent of s.  The probability of injury if the initial actor does not 
take care is therefore E(q)r + (1– E(q))w.  Taking care (installing lifebuoys) is socially 
desirable if 
 
               x + E(q)[E(s)w + (1 – E(s))r]L + [1 – E(q)]wL < E(q)rL + (1 – E(q))wL  
 
which is equivalent to 
 
                                                      x < E(q)E(s)(r – w)L  .                                                 (3) 
 
Constrained by lack of information and by evidence rules, the court uses its observations 
of the intervention probabilities s0 and q0 to determine negligence.  It follows that the 
injurer will be found negligent under the ex post evaluation of negligence if 
 
 
           0 0( )
x s q
r w L
   .             (4)  
 
Thus, if z = sq, and H(z) is the cumulative distribution function, the barge owner will take 
care under negligence when 
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  [1 ]
( )
xx H rL
r w L
       ,                 (5) 
 
which is equivalent to the one-sided causation scenario except for the form of the 
distribution function. 
 
b. Safe Lock Scenario 
 
Another two-sided causation scenario similar to the one just studied involves the locking 
of a safe or some durable precaution designed to prevent an injury.  The obvious example 
is where a hotel purchases a safe for the storage of valuables.  The safe is effective, 
however, only if the hotel employees remember to lock it.  In addition, nothing will 
happen unless thieves attempt to steal valuables from the hotel. 
 
An alternative version of the same scenario: a railroad is transporting a dangerous 
chemical through a populated area. For example, in Watson v. Kentucky & Indiana 
Bridge & R.R.19  a tank car containing gasoline derailed as a result of the defendant 
railroad’s negligence, causing gasoline to spill.  The intervening actor threw a lighted 
match onto the gasoline, causing an explosion that injured the plaintiff.  The question was 
whether the intervening act was foreseeable.  Obviously, there are many variations one 
could offer based on this example. 
 
As a general matter, the railroad must decide whether to purchase a special lock for the 
release valve on the tank car holding the dangerous chemical.  If it purchases the lock, 
someone must remember to actually lock the valve.  In general, however, the risk of 
spillage is low unless an intervening actor deliberately opens the valve to release the 
chemical. 
 
In this class of scenarios the effectiveness of taking care, by purchasing a lockable 
barrier, depends on whether the actor takes the intervening step of engaging the lock.  On 
the other hand, the risk of an injury is minimal unless the intervening actor attempts to 
breach the barrier. 
 
Let s = the probability that the actor engages the lock, and q = the probability that the 
intervening actor attempts to breach the barrier.  I assume, as in the previous part, that the 
probability of attempting to breach the barrier is not dependent on the likelihood of a 
barrier existing. 
 
Taking care is socially desirable in the Safe Lock Scenario if 
 
             x + E(s)wL + (1– E(s))[ E(q)r + (1 – E(q))w]L  < E(q)rL + (1 – E(q))wL  
 
                                                 
19 126 S.W. 146 (Ky. 1910). 
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which simplifies to x < E(q)E(s)(r – w)L.  Since this is the same as (3), the actual 
determination of the care level is governed by (5). 
 
c. Optimality of Care and Distortion Measure, Independent Interventions 
 
The foregoing examples suggest that, as a general matter, the care determination in 
independent interventions scenarios can be described by (5).  This, in turn, implies the 
following: 
 
Proposition 1: In the two-sided intervening causation scenario with independent 
interventions, the negligence test leads to socially excessive care if (r – w)E(s)E(q) < r[1 
– H(E(s)E(q))].  Care is socially optimal if equality holds and socially inadequate if the 
inequality is reversed. 
 
The incentive distortion measure for the independent interventions scenario is 
 
  (1 ( ( ) ( ))
( ) ( )
H E s E qD
E s E q
       .                                         (6) 
 
D < 0 implies that the negligence test induces socially excessive care.  D = 0 is associated 
with optimal care, and D > 0 is associated with inadequate care. 
 
3. Simulation 3: Two-Sided Causation, Beta Distribution Case 
 
Now we simulate incentives for care for the independent interventions, two-sided 
causation scenarios examined previously (Boat Safety, Safe Lock).   
 
The interesting question is whether the distortion from socially optimal care is greater in 
the two-sided causation scenario than in the one-sided scenario.  Since the answer to this 
question depends on assumptions with respect to the productivity of care (φ) and the 
distributions of the intervention probabilities, we use simulations to examine the 
distortion from optimal care. 
 
Following the same approach as in Figure 2, we allowed for the signals q and s to have 
Beta distributions where s is distributed Betas(α, β) and q is distributed Betaq(γ, δ).  The x 
axis in Figure 3 measures the product of the two mean signal values.  The parameters for 
each of the distributions sum to 20 (i.e., α + β = 20, γ + δ = 20).  
 
In carrying out the simulation, we fixed the degree of skewness on the s distribution and 
allowed the other to move from right skew to left skew.  This allows us to replicate the 
simulation approach taken with the one-signal case examined earlier in Figure 2. 
 
Specifically, the dark line fixes the distribution of s at the symmetric position and permits 
the distribution of q to run from a strong right skew to a strong left skew.  As the skew 
moves from right to left, the value on the horizontal axis, (α/(α + β))×(γ/(γ + δ)), moves 
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from left to right.  We repeated the same exercise with different assumptions on α and β 
shown below. 
 
As Figure 3 shows, the distortion levels in the two-sided causation scenario are greater 
than in the one-sided causation scenario simulated in Figure 2.  Moreover, in order to find 
a set of parameter values which generated socially optimal care taking, we had to set the 
productivity of care at the highest level (φ = (.95 – .05)/.95 ≈ .95).  For care productivity 
levels φ = .66 and φ = .89, care is socially excessive for all of the Beta parameter 
combinations tested. 
 
The dotted curve in Figure 3 is the only one that crosses the zero distortion line and that 
crossing occurs where the value on the horizontal axis is 0.87.  The dotted curve 
represents the most extreme right skew combination that we could implement in this 
simulation.  For the dotted curve, s is distributed Betas(19,1) and q is permitted to move 
from a strong right skew (Betaq(1, 19)) to a strong left skew ((Betaq(19,1)).  Yet, even in 
this case, negative distortion values – signaling socially excessive care – are observed for 
all but two of the parameter combinations used for the q distribution.  These results 
suggest that the optimal care outcome is unlikely to be observed in the two-sided 
causation scenario. 
 
 
 
                  Figure 3: Distortion from Optimal Care, Two-Sided Causation, Beta 
                  Distribution Case (assuming φ ≈ .95) 
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C. Interdependent Interventions 
 
We extend the analysis here to two-sided causation scenarios where intervention on the 
risk side depends on intervention on the care side.  Although we provide no simulations, 
the distortion from optimality observed earlier in the independent interventions scenarios 
appears to be even greater in the interdependent interventions scenarios.   
 
1. Safe Lock Scenario II 
 
The probability that an intervening criminal actor strikes depends on whether the initial 
actor takes care.  For example, the initial actor decides whether to leave his keys in the 
car, and the intervening actor decides whether to attempt to steal the car.  If the 
intervening actor sees that the keys are inside the car, he is more likely to steal the car.  
 
Care is socially desirable if 
 
                  x + E(s)rL + (1– E(s))wL  < E(q)rL + (1 – E(q))wL .                          (7) 
 
In this condition, the left-hand side represents the social cost when the initial actor (car 
owner) chooses to take care.  Society bears the cost of taking care plus the expected cost 
of a car theft, given the car owner’s decision to take care.  The expected probability that 
the thief will intervene when the car owner takes care is E(s).  The right-hand side shows 
the cost to society when the car owner does not take care, in which case the expected 
intervention probability is E(q).  Condition (7) is equivalent to 
 
                                                     x < [E(q) – E(s)](r – w)L  .                                           (8) 
 
A limited-information court will hold the actor liable under the negligence test if  
 
         x < (q0 – s0)(r – w)L  .                                               (9) 
 
This case is interesting because it indicates that taking care is never socially desirable in 
this scenario when E(s) ≥ E(q).  It follows that if the intervention probabilities, q and s, 
are both from a symmetric distribution, taking care is never socially desirable.  These 
implications are economically reasonable because if the expected intervention probability 
is higher when the car owner takes care, then taking care is a waste of resources.   
 
The interesting feature of this intervening causation scenario is that the car owner may 
have an incentive to take care, given the structure of the negligence test, even when 
taking care could not possibly be socially desirable.  The incentive distortion created by 
the negligence test is at least as severe in this scenario as in the preceding causation 
scenarios examined. 
   
Substituting v = 1 – s allows us to express (9) as the sum of two random variables, v + q.  
Using this, taking care is socially desirable if  
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             x < [E(q) + E(v) – 1](r – w)L 
 
Letting H(z) represent the distribution function for the sum of random variables z = q + v, 
we have the following result. 
 
Proposition 2: In the interdependent interventions scenario, the negligence test leads to 
socially excessive care if (r – w)(E(q) + E(v) – 1) < r[1 – H(E(q)+E(v))].  Care is socially 
optimal if equality holds and socially inadequate if the inequality is reversed. 
 
The case of symmetric distributions is easiest to examine.  For the symmetric case, E(q) = 
E(v) = ½, and H(E(q) + E(v)) = H(1).  Since H(1) is the value of the distribution function 
evaluated at its median, and the distribution of the sum of two independent symmetric 
random variables is also symmetric, the median is the same as the mean, which implies 
H(1) = ½.  Given this, the condition in Proposition 2 reduces to 0 < r/2, where 0 is the 
marginal social value of care in this case.  Thus, in the symmetric distribution case, some 
actors will have incentives to take care even under conditions in which care is never 
socially desirable, no matter how productive care appears to be based on the differential 
r-w. 
 
2. Non-Exogenous Intervention 
 
There are still more variations on the two-sided causation scenarios examined here.  If the 
second actor (e.g., the thief) bases his decision, at least in part, on the initial actor’s (the 
owner’s) probability of intervention, then the probability of the second actor’s 
intervention may be a function of the probability of the first actor’s intervention.  
Consider for example, the Safe Lock Scenario where the second actor’s probability of 
attempting to break the barrier (e.g., open the valve or open the safe door) is a function of 
the first actor’s probability of intervention (locking the valve or safe door).  If the second 
actor’s intervention probability is simply a function of the first actor’s intervention 
probability, then the scenario is no longer one of two-sided causation. 
 
The models examined previously assume that the intervention probabilities are 
exogenous.  Of course there are settings, in addition to the case where the second actor’s 
intervention probability is dependent on the first actor’s, where the exogeneity 
assumption would be inappropriate.  Suppose, for example, that the first actor can choose 
or constrain his probability of intervention.  The precaution decision involves investment 
in a durable precautionary measure and in constraining the first actor’s probability of 
intervention.  To take a specific example, suppose the first actor is the owner of a railroad 
tank car used to transport dangerous chemicals and the second actor is a vandal.  The 
owner decides how much to invest in a lockable valve for the tank car, and how much to 
invest in monitoring employees to induce them to consistently lock the valve, all while 
knowing how the second actor’s probability of intervention changes in response. 
 
D. Solutions to the Excessive Care Problem 
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One reform that would greatly reduce the tendency to excessive care revealed in these 
models is for courts to follow the recommendation of Shavell (1985) by awarding a 
proportionate damages measure φL = (r – w)L/r.  Under proportionate damages, the 
distortion measure for the one-sided causation scenario becomes D = 1 – (1-G(E(s))/E(s), 
which is equal to zero for any symmetrically distributed intervention probability.  Thus, 
whatever the value of the productivity of care measure φ (between the limits of zero and 
one), the zero distortion (optimal care) outcome would be attainable.  Similarly, for the 
two-sided (independent interventions) scenario, the distortion measure would be D = 1 – 
(1-G(E(s)E(q))/E(s)E(q), with the same implication.   
 
III. Conclusion 
 
The early literature on causation demonstrates that if courts have full information, 
incentives for care are optimal if the likelihood of judicial error is zero (Grady, Kahan, 
Marks).  The more realistic assumption, in our view, is that courts do not have full 
information.  In particular, courts do not always have full information on the range and 
the probabilities of all of the intervening causal factors.  We have allowed for the court to 
be in a position of Knightian uncertainty, in the sense that it does not know the 
distributions of the relevant intervention probabilities.20  The innovation of this paper is 
its consideration of intervening causal factors affecting both the impact of care and the 
impact of a failure to take care on the likelihood of injury (two-sided causation). 
 
Under the alternative informational assumptions here, incentives for care are not 
necessarily optimal in the rich set of causation scenarios typically confronted by courts.  
Our examination of one-sided and two-sided causation scenarios finds that care 
incentives are often distorted from optimality, and that the two-sided causation scenarios 
compound distortions (generally in the direction of excessive care) to a degree that 
suggests that the optimal care outcome is implausible.  A proportionate damages 
measure, as originally suggested in Shavell (1985), provides a potential solution to this 
problem. 
 
 
                                                 
20 More generally, we can distinguish three types of causation case.  In the first, courts have full 
information, as in the case of car driven at a negligently fast speed, and the counterfactual events can be 
calculated easily and with accuracy.  In the second, the court can accurately determine optimal care, but 
cannot determine easily determine whether the defendant complied with it – as, for example, in the cricket 
hypothetical of Kahan (1989).  The third scenario, which is the focus here, is one of Knightian uncertainty. 
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Appendix 
 
Definition 1: The random variable X is said to have a Beta type I distribution with 
parameters  , ,  0, 0a b a b   denoted as  ~ ,IX B a b , if its p.d.f. is given by 
    1 11, 1 ,  0 1,baB a b x x x      
where,  ,B a b  is the Beta function given by 
         1,B a b a b a b       
and the gamma function    1 !.n n    
 
Definition 2: The random variable X is said to have a hypergeometric function type I 
distribution, denoted by  ~ , , , ,IX H      if its p.d.f. is given by  
   
         
11
2 11 , ; ;1 ,  0 1,x x F x x
             
                
where,        
   
 22 1 0
1 1
, ; ; 1 ,
1! 2! 1 !
n
n n
n n
a ba a b bab zF a b c z z z
c c c c n


      
  
0 and 0.           
 
Definition 3: Let 1X and 2X  be independent,  ~ , ,  1, 2.Ii i iX B a b i   Then, 
 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2~ , , , .IX X H a b a b a b b    
 
See Zarrozola and Nagar (2009). 
 
 
1. Single Signal Case (Beta Distribution) 
  aE s
a b
   
      
  11
0
1 1
,
E s baG E s x x dx
B a b
    
 
To compute the value, we used “betacdf” in Matlab. 
   
 
1 G E sr wD
r E s
      
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where ,r w  are given. 
 
2. Two Signal Case (Beta Distribution) 
   ,  a cE s E q
a b c d
    
 
Based on the Definition 3 above, the product of independent Beta variables follows 
 1 2 ~ , , , .IX X H a d a b c b d    
 
                 
    11
2 10
1 , ; ;1
E s E q b a d c
H E s E q x x F d a b c a x dx
b d a c
           
 
To compute the values for the simulation, we used “int” in Matlab and assuming n=3 in  
 2 1 , ; ;1F a b c x . 
